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DUE PROCESS RESTRAINED: THE DUAL 
DILEMMAS OF DISCRIMINATE AND 
INDISCRIMINATE SHACKLING IN 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 
Leah Rabinowitz*
Abstract: In Hidden in Plain Sight, Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues 
for the advancement of children’s rights through the development of a 
child-centric perspective. She identifies five principles to further that 
goal, including the principles of agency and dignity. These principles 
shed light on the problem of shackling juveniles during their delin-
quency proceedings. While a recent United States Supreme Court ruling 
barred indiscriminate shackling for all adult defendants, the status of 
juveniles remains unclear. Yet even in states that do not shackle juveniles 
without cause, significant problems remain. This Comment identifies and 
examines these problems, arguing for increased attention to shackled 
juveniles’ due process and fundamental dignity rights. The Comment 
concludes with proposals to improve the discriminate approach, with 
Woodhouse’s child-centric model in mind. 
Introduction 
[A]ll juvenile proceedings must contain essentials of due process and fair 
treatment. In our view, the constitutional presumption of innocence, the right 
to present and participate in the defense, the interest in maintaining human 
dignity and the respect for the entire judicial system, are among these essen-
tials whether the accused is 41 or 14.1
 
 Mike, a sixteen-year old African-American male, stands in the 
crowded and boisterous hallway of the Boston Juvenile Court.2 He has 
bravely agreed to discuss his experience with being shackled.3 The po-
lice detained Mike and brought him into court following a school fight, 
                                                                                                                      
* Staff Writer, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2008–2009). 
1 Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 375 (Ct. App. 2007). 
2 Interview with Juvenile, in Boston, Mass. (Dec. 3, 2008). The juvenile’s name is 
changed to protect his identity. 
3 Id. 
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but the charges were dismissed before arraignment.4 As his defense 
attorney put it, “the case never went anywhere.”5
 Even so, like hundreds of other boys and girls, he appeared before 
the judge in handcuffs and leg irons.6 Surely he posed some sort of 
danger? Not at all, Mike scoffed; he never missed a court appearance or 
attempted escape from custody.7 He never did or said anything threat-
ening either in detainment or in court.8 No one ever explained to Mike 
why he was shackled, though he seemed to understand and accept it as 
“standard procedure.”9
 When asked to describe what being shackled felt like, Mike did not 
hesitate. “I felt bad,” he said. “The cuffs are too tight. They hurt.”10 
What about the leg irons? “Your legs are squished together. You can’t 
walk right.”11 Mike heard other juveniles tell court officers that their 
cuffs were too tight. Some officers loosened them; others refused. Mike 
never bothered to complain, he said with a tone of defeat.12 Did shack-
ling make Mike feel anything else? “Yeah,” he replied. “It made me feel 
like a criminal.”13
 This young man’s experience directly contradicts the fundamental 
notion of due process within the juvenile justice system.14 As with Amer-
ica’s adult justice system, due process rights are deeply cherished and 
                                                                                                                      
4 Interview with Cecely Reardon, Supervising Att’y, Youth Advocacy Project, Comm. 
for Pub. Counsel Servs., in Boston, Mass. (Dec. 3, 2008). 
5 Id. 
6 Interview with Juvenile, supra note 2. 
7 Interview with Reardon, supra note 4. 
8 Interview with Juvenile, supra note 2. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Interview with Juvenile, supra note 2. 
14 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12, 29 (1967) (explicitly granting due process rights to ju-
veniles, including the right to notice of charges, to counsel, to confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses, and to the privilege against self-incrimination) (“[N]either the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”); Kent v. United States, 
383 U.S. 541, 554, 557 (1966) (granting juveniles in the waiver context the right to a hear-
ing and to a statement of reasons for the judge’s decision) (“[T]here is no place in our 
system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony—
without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. It 
is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with respect to a similar issue, 
would proceed in this manner.”). For decades, Kent and Gault have served as launch-pads 
for legal study on the intricate relationship between due process and juvenile delinquency 
matters. See, e.g., State ex rel. Juv. Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860 
(Or. Ct. App. 1995) (expanding upon Gault and expressly noting that “juveniles have the 
same right as adult defendants to appear free from physical restraints”). 
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embedded in the juvenile justice system.15 Such rights are meant to 
provide children appearing in court with essential safeguards against 
unjust deprivation of their liberty.16 In the past four decades, beginning 
with Kent v. United States and In re Gault, the Supreme Court has made 
admirable strides towards recognizing the importance of children’s 
rights by demonstrating an enhanced understanding of and sensitivity 
to those rights.17
 Nevertheless, scholars have questioned whether Gault’s promises 
to juveniles and their advocates have been fulfilled, particularly in juve-
nile delinquency cases.18 The propriety of shackling juveniles during 
delinquency proceedings is one area that has gained increasing promi-
nence during the past three years.19 This question has posed a particu-
larly difficult challenge for legal scholars because the factors on both 
sides—the child’s liberty versus the security of the courtroom and the 
safety of its occupants—are unusually compelling.20
                                                                                                                      
 
15 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 29; Kent, 383 U.S. at 554. 
16 See Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 374 (concluding that the “unjustified use of physi-
cal restraints relate[s] directly to the constitutional values . . . that the due process clause 
was intended to protect”). In addition, the court referred to the importance of an ac-
cused’s “right to present a defense” and the “presumption of innocence.” Id. 
17 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005) (noting three differences between 
juveniles and adults: their “susceptibility to immature and irresponsible behavior,” their 
“vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings,” and 
their “struggle to define their identity”). The Court then concludes, “[o]nce juveniles’ 
diminished culpability is recognized, it is evident that neither of the two penological justi-
fications for the death penalty—retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospec-
tive offenders—provides adequate justification for imposing that penalty on juveniles.” Id. 
18 See Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise, 9 Barry L. Rev. 67, 68 (2007). In delinquency 
cases, district attorneys seek an adjudication from the court that a juvenile is a delinquent 
because he or she has committed an offense proscribed by law. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws 
ch. 119, § 52 (2008). 
19 See In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3, 5–6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (grappling with the issue of 
shackling juveniles during their adjudicatory hearings in Illinois juvenile courts). Among 
the court’s considerations were the juvenile’s ability to communicate with counsel and 
assist in his or her own defense. Id. at 5. Ultimately, the court held that shackling the juve-
nile Staley was an error warranting remand for another adjudicatory hearing. Id. at 6. 
Cases like Staley are helpful in that they hone in on the particular dilemma posed by shack-
ling pre-adjudicated juveniles in court as opposed to on route to and from the courtroom. 
See id. at 5. But cf. State v. Lewis, 990 So. 2d 109, 118 (La. Ct. App. Aug. 13, 2008) (consid-
ering defendant’s argument for reversible error after a juror saw the defendant “being 
transported to the courtroom for trial [in shackles] and mentioned it to another juror”); 
State v. Tommy Y., Jr., 637 S.E.2d 628, 638 (W. Va. 2006) (“[No] court in the country . . . 
prohibits transporting a prisoner to a courthouse wearing prison garb or shackles. Any 
rule to the contrary would be ludicrous.”). While shackling during transportation is an 
issue that merits attention, this Comment does not address it. 
20 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 346–47 (1970); S.Y. v. McMillan, 562 So. 2d 807, 
808–09 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (denying a pre-adjudicated juvenile’s challenge to the use 
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 In 2005, in Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court held the indis-
criminate shackling of a criminal defendant during the sentencing 
phase of a capital case unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, absent a showing that restraints are “justified by an es-
sential state interest.”21 This holding was consistent with a line of cases 
in which courtroom security alone was deemed an insufficient justifica-
tion for shackling an accused.22 The decision also served as the cap-
stone to over a century of legal thought, in which the shackling of any 
accused was generally and persistently disfavored.23 However, the Deck 
court did not comment on whether its ruling applied to juvenile delin-
quency cases, which, strictly speaking, are not criminal proceedings.24
 Even in the wake of Deck, Massachusetts, like other states, has con-
tinued to shackle all juveniles indiscriminately during delinquency pro-
ceedings.25 Other states have adopted an approach more in line with 
Deck—in these states, the juvenile court conducts a case-specific evalua-
tion before a juvenile is left shackled.26 However, even this discriminate 
                                                                                                                      
of shackles during court proceedings). The court cited evidence that shackling had “a 
positive effect on the security and decorum in the courtroom” and also noted that “fights 
among the juveniles and escape attempts had decreased.” See McMillan, 562 So. 2d at 808–
09. 
21 See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624, 629 (2005) (holding indiscriminate shack-
ling unconstitutional and requiring a case-specific evaluation). 
22 See id. at 632; Solomon v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3–4 (Ct. App. 1981) (find-
ing a failure to prove necessity because the trial judge did not send for more bailiffs before 
ordering the defendant shackled). This logic was then cited in Tiffany A.. See 59 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 372–73 (“We note that no California State court has endorsed the use of physical 
restraints based solely on the defendants’ status in custody, the lack of courtroom security 
personnel, or the inadequacy of the court facilities.”). 
23 See People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 367 (Ill. 2006) (Freeman, J., dissenting) (“The 
United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the deep-rooted, historical aversion the 
judiciary has long had toward trying a criminal defendant in restraints.”). 
24 See Kent, 383 U.S. at 554 (noting that delinquency proceedings are “designated as 
civil rather than criminal” and therefore strive “to provide measures of guidance and re-
habilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal responsibility, guilt 
and punishment”). Indeed, there is an important distinction between an adjudication of 
delinquency and a finding of guilt because a finding of guilt implicates the adult justice 
system and the protections therein. See id. at 556; Courtney P. Fain, What’s in a Name? The 
Worrisome Interchange of Juvenile “Adjudications” with Criminal “Convictions”, 49 B.C. L. Rev. 
495, 498 (2008). 
25 Telephone Interview with Ken King, Assoc. Clinical Professor, Juvenile Defender 
Clinic, Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. (Dec. 3, 2008). Governor Deval Patrick of Massachusetts 
nominated Professor King to the Middlesex Juvenile Court in December of 2008. Press 
Release, Suffolk University, Professor Nominated to Middlesex Juvenile Court (Dec. 1, 
2008), available at http://www.suffolk.edu/33320.html. 
26 See Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 365; In re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 629 (Ct. 
App. 2007); In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007). 
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approach fails to protect juveniles’ full rights to procedural and sub-
stantive due process.27
 These failures become even more apparent in light of Barbara 
Bennett Woodhouse’s book, Hidden in Plain Sight.28 Woodhouse argues 
for an enhanced view of children’s rights and advocates for a child-
centric perspective.29 She identifies five values or “principles” at the 
heart of this child-centric perspective—privacy, agency, equality, dignity, 
and protection.30 In particular, the practice of shackling runs afoul of 
Woodhouse’s agency and dignity principles.31 Under the agency prin-
ciple, a child is entitled to “play an active role in shaping his or her own 
destiny.”32 An important component of the agency principle, according 
to Woodhouse, is the right to be heard in court.33 Under the “indispen-
sable” dignity principle, every child deserves “inherent human dig-
nity.”34 In order to realize that dignity, she continues, jurists should 
adopt a broad reading of the guarantee of “liberty” expressed in the 
Fourteenth Amendment.35 Woodhouse sees “freedom from bodily 
harm and restraint” as falling well within the bounds of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protections.36 With Woodhouse’s two principles in mind, 
one can better analyze and attempt to resolve the defects in the dis-
criminate approach.37
 Part I of this Comment explores indiscriminate shackling. This 
Comment first uses Massachusetts as a case study and then touches 
upon other states, particularly Florida, through recent criticism of the 
practice. This Comment then explores criticism of indiscriminate 
shackling in light of the agency and dignity principles, with a special 
emphasis on physical and psychological harms. Part II describes the 
discriminate approach in detail. Part III explains how discriminate 
                                                                                                                      
27 See, e.g., In re Kenneth T., No. J05–01577, 2008 WL 3856658, at *10 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Aug. 20, 2008). In failing to fully grasp the rights at stake for shackled juveniles, many 
courts have issued disappointing decisions on the issue of shackling in delinquency cases. 
See id. 
28 See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Hidden in Plain Sight: The Tragedy of 
Children’s Rights from Ben Franklin to Lionel Tate 29–34 (2008). Woodhouse is the 
David H. Levin Chair in Family Law and founding director of the Center on Children and 
Families at the University of Florida. 
29 Id. at 30. 
30 Id. at 34. 
31 See id. 
32 Id. at 37. 
33 Woodhouse, supra note 28, at 38. 
34 Id. at 40. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See id. at 34. 
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shackling is problematic because it deprives juveniles of due process 
and represents an affront to their fundamental rights. This Comment 
first argues that current practices violate juveniles’ agency right, at both 
the trial and appellate levels. It then argues that current practices vio-
late juveniles’ dignity right by failing to consider excessive psychological 
harms. Part IV draws upon Woodhouse’s child-centric framework to 
suggest ways to remedy and improve the discriminate approach and 
argues for a legal analysis that better recognizes shackled juveniles’ 
fundamental rights. 
I. Indiscriminate Shackling in Action 
A. The Curious Case of Massachusetts 
 Many states, including Massachusetts, continue to employ the in-
discriminate approach.38 In Massachusetts, all juveniles brought to 
court from detainment are transported in shackles, remain shackled 
during their proceedings, and, if they are not released from custody, 
escorted back to detainment in shackles.39 The rationale underlying 
this practice is simple—shackling is thought to be the best, if not the 
only, way to ensure safety in the courtroom.40 The justification for the 
practice arose from two courtroom disruptions—one in which a juve-
nile flipped a counsel table over, breaking the glass pane on top, and 
another in which a juvenile made rude comments to an Assistant Dis-
trict Attorney as he was escorted behind the Commonwealth’s table.41
 However, hindsight suggests that shackling would not have pre-
vented either of these two incidents because a handcuffed juvenile 
could still muster enough leverage to flip a table, and shackles cannot 
prevent rude comments.42 In addition, the second juvenile would not 
have passed by the Commonwealth’s table at all if the placement of 
people and furniture in the courtroom had been less “ill-considered.”43 
Escape attempts are especially unlikely in a courthouse like the Boston 
Juvenile Court, where the delinquency session has only one public 
                                                                                                                      
38 Telephone Interview with King, supra note 25. 
39 Id. Judge King notes that this practice applies to most proceedings, but not to some 
fact-finding proceedings, such as trials, competency hearings, or hearings on motions to 
suppress. E-mail from Ken King, Middlesex Juvenile Court, to author (Mar. 17, 2009, 
14:18:00 EST) (on file with author). 
40 Telephone Interview with King, supra note 25. 
41 Id.; E-mail from Ken King, supra note 39. 
42 E-mail from Ken King, supra note 39. 
43 Telephone Interview with King, supra note 25. 
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doorway with heavy swinging doors, officers are stationed in the court-
room and in the hallway, and at least two floors separate the courtroom 
from the main exit.44 Successful escape, therefore, is “virtually impos-
sible.”45
 Moreover, the mandate for the indiscriminate approach in Massa-
chusetts does not come not from the bench; rather, it seems to derive 
from the unwritten policies of courtroom security personnel.46 There is 
not a single statute, precedent, or court rule that authorizes the indis-
criminate shackling of juveniles.47 However, the Massachusetts Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, which generally apply to delinquency proceed-
ings, require discriminate shackling for adult defendants.48 It is unclear 
why this particular Rule does not extend to delinquency matters—or if 
it does, why it is so openly disregarded.49
B. Academic Criticism of Indiscriminate Shackling 
 Following Deck, juveniles have legally challenged indiscriminate 
shackling policies in a few states, though no such challenges have been 
brought in Massachusetts.50 Opponents of the practice launched an 
especially prominent anti-shackling movement in Florida in late 2006.51 
                                                                                                                      
 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. (commenting that there is “no articulated, principled reason” for the indiscrimi-
nate shackling policy). 
48 See Mass R. Crim. P. 45(a). 
49 Telephone Interview with King, supra note 25. 
50 See id.; Anita Nabha, Note, Shuffling to Justice: Why Children Should Not Be Shackled in 
Court, 73 Brook. L. Rev. 1549, 1550 (2008) (noting pending litigation in Florida and New 
York); Press Release, Legal Aid of N.C., Legal Aid Requests Court Cease Shackling of Minor 
Child (Feb. 5, 2007), available at http://www.lsc.gov/press/updates_2007_detail_T158_R4. 
php (introducing litigation in North Carolina). Procedurally, the shackling issue usually 
arises in the form of a post-adjudication appeal from a denied motion to unshackle, where 
the relief sought is vacating the adjudication or, at the very least, reversal and remand for a 
new trial. See, e.g., In re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 628–29 (Ct. App. 2007). 
51 See Jan Pudlow, Committee Takes Issue with ‘Indiscriminate Shackling’ of Juveniles, Fla. 
Bar News, Oct. 1, 2006, available at http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNNews01. 
nsf (search “shackling”; then follow hyperlink for article dated Oct. 1, 2006). In September 
2006, the Florida Bar’s Legal Needs of Children Committee unanimously voted to oppose 
the blanket shackling of juveniles in response to a bevy of motions by public defenders to 
unshackle juveniles in court. Id.; see Bernard P. Perlmutter, Unchain the Children: Gault, 
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and Shackling, 9 Barry L. Rev. 1, 16–28 (2007). In December 
2006, the Board of County Commissioners in Miami-Dade County adopted a resolution 
urging the state legislature to ban the indiscriminate shackling of juveniles. See Miami-
Dade, Fla., Resolution 63,613 (Dec. 19, 2006), available at http://www.miamidade.gov/ 
govaction/searchleg.asp (search “063613” in file number field, follow 063613 hyperlink). 
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As a result, scholars have begun to take notice of the problems with in-
discriminately shackling all juveniles.52 One scholar extensively cri-
tiqued Florida’s indiscriminate shackling policy, exploring the way that 
it violates the due process rights of juveniles.53 He noted that indis-
criminate shackling fails to consider children’s constitutionally guaran-
teed liberty interest.54 The scholar then compared juveniles’ due proc-
ess rights to those of adult defendants, placing a special emphasis on 
the impact of Gault and the rights it guarantees to juveniles.55 He noted 
that the Gault court “would find routine indiscriminate shackling a 
thoroughly reprehensible practice.”56 The scholar concludes that indis-
criminately shackling juveniles is an undesirable policy that should be 
terminated.57
 Another scholar argued that Deck’s bar on indiscriminate shackling 
should apply to delinquency proceedings.58 Moving away from indis-
criminate shackling, she concludes, is more in line with the juvenile 
justice system’s goal of rehabilitation.59 Moreover, eliminating indis-
criminate shackling would provide a sense of fairness to juveniles ap-
pearing in court.60
 Finally, a study conducted by the Center on Children and Families 
challenged the practice of shackling as a courtroom security measure.61 
The study first noted that only 4.5 percent of juvenile offense cases na-
tionwide in 2006 involved a violent crime, whereas property crimes rep-
resented eighteen percent and non-violent status offenders comprised 
twenty-nine percent.62 The study also reported on its observations of 
juveniles during their proceedings in Alachua County, Florida in 
2007.63 Overall, ninety-three percent of juveniles there were rated as 
                                                                                                                      
Not all of Florida’s Juvenile Court judges have fallen into line, but some have “curtailed or 
abolished” the policy of blanket shackling in their courtrooms. See Perlmutter, supra, at 25. 
For instance, efforts to change shackling in Dade County were successful, but similar ef-
forts in Palm Beach County were not. See Emily Banks et al., Ctr. on Children. & Fami-
lies, The Shackling of Juvenile Offenders: The Debate in Juvenile Justice Policy 5 
(2008). 
52 See Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 25. 
53 See id. at 4. 
54 See id. at 47. 
55 Id. at 35–37. 
56 Id. at 36. 
57 See Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 58. 
58 Nabha, supra note 50, at 1575. 
59 Id. at 1551. 
60 Id. at 1587. 
61 See Banks et al., supra note 51, at 3, 9. 
62 Id. at 3. 
63 Id. at 8. 
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“compliant,” four percent “withdrawn,” and a mere one percent “defi-
ant.”64 Given these data, the efficacy of shackling as a courtroom secu-
rity measures comes under great scrutiny.65
C. The Harms of Indiscriminate Shackling 
 Indiscriminate shackling is problematic because it fails to acknowl-
edge juveniles’ agency and dignity rights.66 First, the agency right is vio-
lated because juveniles are given no opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process—in fact, there is no decision-making process 
at all.67 The practice of deferring to security personnel runs counter to 
a great deal of modern case law.68 For example, the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota found error when a judge below deferred to law en-
forcement’s decision to shackle.69 Similarly, an Oregon court empha-
sized the duty of the trial judge: “[A] conclusory statement alone by a 
prosecutor or law enforcement officer is not sufficient to permit the 
independent analysis necessary for the exercise of [the court’s] discre-
tion.”70 Moreover, the emphasis on courtroom security to the total ex-
clusion of all other factors such as agency stands against the heft of case 
law.71 For instance, as a California court recently commented, “no Cali-
fornia [s]tate court has endorsed the use of physical restraints based 
solely on the defendants’ status in custody, the lack of courtroom secu-
rity personnel, or the inadequacy of the court facilities.”72
 Second, juveniles’ dignity rights are violated because shackling 
often results in physical and psychological harm.73 The effects of 
shackling, particularly the physical effects, have been documented for 
over a century.74 Moreover, juveniles are more susceptible to suffering 
                                                                                                                      
 
64 Id. at 9. 
65 See id. at 3, 9. 
66 See Woodhouse, supra note 28, at 34–35. 
67 See id. at 37. 
68 See In re R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007); cf. Solomon v. Superior Court, 
177 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3–4 (Ct. App. 1981) (finding a failure to prove necessity because the trial 
judge did not send for more bailiffs before ordering the defendant shackled); State v. 
Champlain, 744 N.W.2d 889, 898–99 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007). 
69 R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d at 331. 
70 State ex rel. Juv. Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1995) (citing State v. Schroeder, 661 P.2d 1111, 1116 (Or. Ct. App. 1983)). 
71 See Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 372–73 (Ct. App. 2007). 
72 Id. 
73 See Woodhouse, supra note 28, at 40; Telephone Interview with King, supra note 25 
(describing indiscriminate shackling as “destructive and unnecessary”). 
74 See Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 370 (“As early as 1871 the California Supreme 
Court recognized placing the criminal defendant in shackles ‘imposes physical burdens, 
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psychological harms after being shackled than are their adult coun-
terparts.75 Shackled juveniles suffer embarrassment and humiliation, 
particularly when surrounded by strangers in the court gallery.76 They 
develop a lowered self-image, feel like captive animals, and are forced 
to surrender their psychological supremacy.77 Some juveniles have 
been shackled for hours at a time while awaiting their turn in court.78 
Exceptionally young juveniles have been shackled, and often experi-
ence intense confusion at the experience.79 Shackling is particularly 
painful for juveniles who already have a background of abuse, usually 
from an authority figure like a parent.80 Some African-American juve-
                                                                                                                      
 
pains and restraints upon a prisoner during the progress of his trial, inevitably tends to 
confuse and embarrass his mental faculties, and thereby materially to abridge and prejudi-
cially affect his constitutional rights of defense.’”) (citing People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 
165, 168 (1871)). 
75 See Millican, 906 P.2d at 861 (DeMuniz, J., dissenting); Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 19–
20 (citing Bennett H. Brummer et al., Pub. Defender Eleventh Jud. Cir. Ct. of Fla., Motion 
for Child to Appear Free from Degrading and Unlawful Restraints, available at http:// 
www.pdmiami.com/unchainthechildren/Unshackle_Calendar_Motion2.pdf); Telephone 
Interview with King, supra note 25 (noting a “labeling, branding, and shaming effect” to 
shackling juveniles). 
76 See People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 372 (Ill. 2006) (Freeman, J., dissenting); 
Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 19–20 (“[B]eing shackled in public is humiliating for young 
people, whose sense of identity is vulnerable.” (citing Brummer et al., supra note 75 at 8)). 
77 See Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 372 (Freeman, J., dissenting); Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 
19–20, 37 (“The young person who feels like he/she is being treated like a dangerous 
animal will think less of him/herself. . . . [B]eing chained like a ‘dangerous animal’ may 
cause the child to feel like one. . . . Being shackled conveys that others see the child as ‘a 
contained beast,’ an image that ‘becomes integrated in his own identity formation, possi-
bly influencing his behavior and responses in the future.’”) (citing Brummer et al., supra 
note 75, at 20, 27, 34). 
78 See Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 6–7 (describing the physical effects of extended 
shackling on juveniles in Miami-Dade, Florida). Perlmutter points to juveniles whose 
“chains stay on for hours at a time, sometimes as long as a full day, and are not removed 
even when the children need to use the bathroom.” Id. Such juveniles suffer “cuts, bruises 
and abrasions from the tight cuffs,” which cause “bleeding and other serious physical 
harms and discomforts.” Id. at 7. 
79 See id. at 6–7; Bob Herbert, Op-Ed., 6-Year Olds Under Arrest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 9, 2007 
at A17. Herbert’s article recounts the arrest and shackling of six-year old Desre’e Watson 
of Avon Park, Florida. After misbehaving in her kindergarten class, the child was charged 
with felony battery on a school official for flailing and kicking at teachers who tried to 
control her during a tantrum, as well as a misdemeanor for disrupting a school function 
for yelling in class. Herbert, supra. She was also charged with resisting a law enforcement 
officer because when she saw officers approaching, she crawled under a table. Id. The 
officers finally pulled Desre’e out from under the table and placed handcuffs on her. Id. 
They had to place them on her biceps because her wrists were too tiny. Id. 
80 See Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 19–20 (noting that shackling poses special psycho-
logical dangers to children “who have been previously traumatized by physical and sexual 
abuse, loss, neglect, and abandonment”). Such children “suffer from depression, attention 
and conduct disorders, and substance abuse.” Id. Shackling also “exacerbates trauma, re-
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niles who have been shackled report feeling like their chained and 
enslaved ancestors.81
 Courts’ failure to consider shackled juveniles’ agency and dignity is 
especially disconcerting because of the rehabilitative aims at the heart 
of the juvenile justice system.82 Troubled juveniles who perceive a court 
system as totally dismissive of their rights have no incentive to reform 
their behavior or to avoid later returning to court as adult defen-
dants.83 Shackling also fails to serve as a deterrent for future delin-
quent behavior.84 As one former defense attorney describes the reason-
ing of juveniles, “people already think I’m bad, so I may as well be 
bad.”85
 The notion of shackling as antithetical to the goals of rehabilita-
tion is reflected in the context of secured treatment facilities.86 In Mas-
sachusetts, for instance, a juvenile committed to the custody of the De-
partment of Youth Services and housed in a secured facility cannot be 
shackled without cause, and then only as a last resort.87 Such policies 
recognize that shackling is often contrary to a juvenile’s rehabilitation, 
and therefore take into account a juvenile’s physical and psychological 
characteristics before making the decision to shackle.88 Thus, common 
sense dictates that judges proceed with caution when the individual to 
be shackled is a juvenile.89
                                                                                                                      
viving feelings of powerlessness, betrayal, and self-blame.” Id. Finally, when restraint was 
part of prior abuse, in-court shackling can “trigger flashbacks and reinforce early feelings 
of powerlessness.” Id. 
81 See id. 
82 See Millican, 906 P.2d at 862 (DeMuniz, J., dissenting); Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile 
Court, 23 Harv. L. Rev. 104 (1909), as reprinted in Barry C. Feld, Cases and Materials 
on Juvenile Justice Administration 7 (2d ed. 2000); Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 375. 
83 See Nabha, supra note 50, at 1582 (“Children may understand that their out-of-
control behavior in a facility has a consequence and may result in the use of restraints. 
However, in court, if without acting inappropriately they are still restrained, children will 
not understand why they are being punished.”). 
84 See id. at 1574 (“Juvenile defenders and scholars note that there is no evidence to 
suggest that shackling juveniles is an effective deterrent to juvenile crime.”). 
85 Telephone Interview with King, supra note 25. 
86 See Mass. Dep’t of Youth Servs. Policy 03.02.08(d), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
Eeohhs2/docs/dys/policies/030208d_restraint_use_force.doc. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. 
89 See Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 19–20. 
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II. The Discriminate Approach in Action 
A. The Requirement of Necessity 
 In states that have abandoned indiscriminate shackling, the prac-
tice is presumed unwarranted unless and until evidence is presented to 
demonstrate otherwise.90 This policy reflects the notion found at the 
heart of American jurisprudence that all defendants are innocent until 
proven guilty.91 While each state using this discriminate approach uses 
slightly different language to define its standard, each definition in-
cludes the requirement of need.92 In California, for instance, the court 
asks whether there is a “manifest need” to shackle a pre-adjudicated 
juvenile.93 In Illinois, children appearing in juvenile court cannot be 
shackled unless there is a “good reason” to do so.94 The state bears the 
initial burden of satisfying these standards, and can only succeed upon 
presenting sufficient evidence that a juvenile “has been unruly, has an-
nounced an intention to escape, or when the evidence shows that the 
[juvenile] would likely disrupt the judicial process if left unre-
strained.”95 More specifically, a court will weigh such considerations as 
the likelihood that the juvenile will attempt escape or disrupt the pro-
                                                                                                                      
90 Cf. People v. Duran, 545 P.2d 1322, 1326 (Cal. 1976) (stating that a trial court must 
allow a defendant to appear “without physical restraints unless there was ‘evident necessity’ 
for the restraint”). This Comment does not argue that there is no case in which in-court 
shackling is unwarranted. See State v. Lehman, 749 N.W.2d 76, 79 (Minn. Ct. App. 2008). 
For instance, in Lehman, a defendant was shackled after he attacked his attorney in court, 
grabbing the attorney by the neck and “punching him repeatedly in the face.” Id. The 
defendant drew blood, and the attorney “suffered a cut lip and a black eye.” Id. The Court 
of Appeals of Minnesota held that the “district court did not abuse its discretion by order-
ing appellant [defendant] restrained for the remainder of the trial.” See id. at 84. Addi-
tionally, in People v. Kimball, the Court correctly found sufficient justification to place 
handcuffs on the defendant. See 55 P.2d 483, 484 (Cal. 1936). There, the government pro-
duced “evidence tending to show that defendant had expressed an intent to escape; that 
he had threatened to injure or kill three or four witnesses in the courtroom by striking 
them over the heads with a chair; [and] that on the first day of the trial a piece of lead 
pipe, fourteen inches in length, was found concealed in the top of one of his boots and 
under the leg of his overalls.” Id. 
91 See James Matthew Thompson, Casenote, Survey of Illinois Law: The Use of Stun Belts in 
Illinois Courts, 31 S. Ill. U. L.J. 967, 967 (2007). 
92 See, e.g., Cal. Penal Code § 688 (West 2008) (“No person charged with a public of-
fense may be subjected, before conviction, to any more restraint than is necessary for his 
detention to answer the charge.”). 
93 See In re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 629 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing People v. Fi-
erro, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 426, 445 (1991)). 
94 See In re Staley, 352 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976). 
95 Cf. People v. Wallace, 189 P.3d 911, 926–27 (Cal. 2008). 
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ceedings, and the juvenile’s “past criminal record, his reputation, and 
his character.”96
 Courts have further held that there is no need to shackle a juvenile 
in court when less drastic alternatives are available and are reasonably 
sufficient.97 For example, a judge who orders a juvenile to be shackled 
solely because there are no or few guards in the courtroom should first 
attempt to procure additional guards.98 A judge’s failure to employ 
these less drastic alternatives when it is reasonable to do so constitutes 
an abuse of that judge’s discretion.99 Unsurprisingly, then, shackling an 
accused during court proceedings is often considered a “last resort.”100
B. Jury Prejudice and Effect on the Defense 
 The analysis under the discriminate approach does not end with 
necessity, however, because necessity must be balanced against other 
important factors.101 Foremost among those factors is prejudice in the 
eyes of the jury.102 In fact, jury prejudice is such an important consid-
eration that, in some jurisdictions, a juvenile’s or defendant’s failure to 
show actual or potential jury prejudice essentially concludes the analy-
sis in the state’s favor, with no other factors coming into play at all.103 
Focusing on jury prejudice puts juveniles at a disadvantage because ju-
veniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial, and only a few 
states allow juries in delinquency cases.104
                                                                                                                      
96 See Deshaun, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 629; Staley, 352 N.E.2d at 6. 
97 Cf. People v. Boose, 337 N.E.2d 338, 341 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (citing Kennedy v. Card-
well, 487 F.2d 101, 111 (6th Cir. 1973)). 
98 See In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Ill. 1977). 
99 See Boose, 337 N.E.2d at 341; Randall E. Tuskowski, Spain v. Rushen: Shackles or Show-
time? A Defendant’s Right to See and Be Seen, 20 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 175, 175 (1990). 
100 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344 (1970). 
101 See, e.g., Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 375 (Ct. App. 2007). 
102 See State v. E.J.Y., 55 P.3d 673, 679 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (“This was a proceeding 
without a jury, which greatly reduces the likelihood of prejudice.”). 
103 See United States v. Lu, 174 F. App’x 390, 396 (9th Cir. 2006); People v. Horn, 755 
N.W.2d 212, 218 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (“[Michigan’s] caselaw holds that a defendant is 
not prejudiced if the jury was unable to see the shackles on the defendant.”). 
104 See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). A similar result arises when 
a judge serves as fact-finder, because courts both explicitly and implicitly reason that the 
average judge “is capable of weighing the appropriate factors without being prejudiced by 
extraneous matters, such as the presence of restraints.” See In re Kenneth T., No. J05–
01577, 2008 WL 3856658, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 20, 2008); In re Christian G., No. J05–
02142, 2007 WL 1302433, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May 4, 2007). 
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 Nevertheless, even if a juvenile has not suffered jury prejudice, he 
or she can still demonstrate that being shackled was improper.105 Be-
yond jury prejudice, many courts also consider the impact of shackling 
on courtroom decorum, the juvenile’s ability to confer with counsel, 
and the juvenile’s decision about whether to testify on his or her own 
behalf.106 In evaluating the impact of shackling on courtroom deco-
rum, the court is concerned with infringing upon the defendant’s right 
to be presumed innocent, for to unfairly shackle an accused is deeply 
offensive to our system of justice.107
 Further, a juvenile’s ability to confer with counsel and to freely de-
cide whether to take the stand is an essential part of the adjudication 
process.108 If a juvenile is ordered to wear handcuffs, the court must 
consider whether the cuffs would unfairly infringe on that juvenile’s 
ability to write notes to his attorney.109 Similarly, courts must consider 
whether shackling would cause the juvenile such anxiety that he would 
not be able to concentrate on communicating with counsel or on deliv-
ering testimony from the witness stand.110 Overall, the juvenile court 
judge’s mandate is to analyze and weigh all of these factors together, 
thereby engaging in an individualized risk assessment of each case and 
                                                                                                                      
105 See Tiffany A., 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 371; cf. People v. Robinson, 872 N.E.2d 1061, 1071 
(Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
106 See Duran, 545 P.2d at 1326–27 (quoting People v. Harrington, 42 Cal. 165, 168 
(1871)); cf. Boose, 337 N.E.2d at 340. 
107 See Eaddy v. People, 174 P.2d 717, 718–19 (Colo. 1946); Staley, 364 N.E.2d at 73. 
108 Cf. Allen, 397 U.S. at 344 (“[O]ne of the defendant’s primary advantages of being 
present at the trial, his ability to communicate with his counsel, is greatly reduced when 
the defendant is in a condition of total physical restraint.”); Gonzalez v. Pliler, 341 F.3d 
897, 900 (9th Cir. 2003). 
109 See Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630 (holding that any error in shackling juvenile 
was harmless because juvenile’s “right hand was freed from restraints so that he could write 
and communicate with counsel”). 
110 See State ex rel. Juv. Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860–61 
(Or. Ct. App. 1995); cf. People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 372 (Ill. 2006). The issue of the 
distracted defendant-witness takes on greater importance when stun belts are used. See 
United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002). The court explained that 
[w]earing a stun belt is a considerable impediment to a defendant’s ability to 
follow the proceedings and take an active interest in the presentation of his 
case. It is reasonable to assume that much of a defendant’s focus and atten-
tion when wearing one of these devices is occupied by anxiety over the possi-
ble triggering of the belt. A defendant is likely to concentrate on doing every-
thing he can to prevent the belt from being activated, and is thus less likely to 
participate fully in his defense at trial. 
Id.; see People v. Mar, 52 P.3d 95, 106 (Cal. 2002). 
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making a reasoned decision on shackling accordingly.111 This analysis 
makes clear that unwarranted shackling interferes with the right to a 
fair trial and constitutes a due process violation.112
III. The Problems with Discriminate Approach 
A. No Requirement of a Hearing 
 While the discriminate approach is certainly superior to the indis-
criminate approach described in Part I, it is flawed in that it fails to fully 
protect pre-adjudicated juveniles’ right to due process.113 One defect in 
the discriminate approach is that juvenile court judges are not required 
to hold formal hearings on the propriety of shackling pre-adjudicated 
juveniles.114 However, it is a positive step forward that, in most states, 
courts must make a record as to the necessity of shackling pre-
adjudicated juveniles.115 The record must go beyond mere insinuation 
and contain facts that document the child’s risk level.116 It is helpful, 
too, that there can be no presumption of necessity where a record is 
silent on the question.117
 Yet the lack of a formal hearing poses numerous legal and moral 
problems—most importantly, without a formal hearing, a juvenile court 
judge is far less likely to understand the full impact of his or her deci-
sion to shackle any given juvenile.118 A hearing allows a juvenile to call 
witnesses who can rebut the state’s evidence of risk and offer mitigating 
physical or psychological evidence.119 Withholding this opportunity can 
cause a shackled juvenile significant harm.120 First, a juvenile may per-
ceive that the court is not giving him the chance to be heard fully on 
such a crucial point, and thereby runs afoul of Woodhouse’s agency 
                                                                                                                      
111 See Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 49; cf. Nelson v. State, 170 P.3d 517, 525 (Nev. 
2007). 
112 See James Benjamin, Note, Failure to Object to In-Court Restraints: The Boose and Plain 
Error Doctrines in People v. Allen, 57 DePaul L. Rev. 193, 206 (2007); Tuskowski, supra note 
94, at 176. 
113 See State ex rel. Juv. Dep’t of Multnomah County v. Millican, 906 P.2d 857, 860–61 
(Or. Ct. App. 1995); cf. People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 355 (Ill. 2006). 
114 Cf. State v. Kunze, 738 N.W.2d 472, 478 (N.D. 2007). 
115 Cf. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 353; People v. Boose, 362 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ill. 1977). 
116 Cf. People v. McDaniel, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 845, 850 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting People v. 
Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 382 (Cal. 2001)). 
117 See State v. Brewster, 261 S.E.2d 77, 82 (W. Va. 1979). 
118 See Nabha, supra note 50, at 1576. 
119 See Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 377–78 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
120 See Nabha, supra note 50, at 1575–78. 
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principle.121 Second, without the ability to introduce mitigating evi-
dence, an especially vulnerable juvenile might suffer special physical or 
psychological harm due to shackling, beyond the already substantial 
harms that exist for the average juvenile in the justice system.122
B. Passive Appellate Review 
 Not only do juveniles face due process difficulties at trial, but they 
also face formidable obstacles on appeal.123 To counter the state’s evi-
dence that shackling was needed, the petitioner-juvenile is expected to 
produce concrete evidence that he or she posed no risk of harm or es-
cape and therefore was prejudiced below.124 But as Justice Freeman 
commented in People v. Allen, “How exactly is a defendant to show that 
his presumption of innocence was compromised? What type of record 
evidence would support a finding of a compromised presumption of 
innocence?”125
 Justice Freeman explained that the negative effects of shackling, 
such as nervous twitching or shaking, likely would not appear on the 
record because they are non-verbal.126 In fact, a juvenile may purpose-
fully refrain from verbalizing his or her discomfort out of fear that he 
or she would receive worse treatment from security personnel in the 
future.127 These non-verbal cues are important because they can repre-
sent the difference between finding a juvenile delinquent or not delin-
quent, particularly when the case is heard by a jury.128 Yet a dilemma 
arises because “a defendant’s nontestifying demeanor is not a tradi-
tional form of courtroom evidence.”129
 The gaps in the record due to non-verbal factors place shackled 
juveniles at a tremendous disadvantage on appeal.130 With appellate 
courts generally declining to conduct a de novo review of a juvenile 
court judge’s shackling decision, those juvenile court judges have wide 
                                                                                                                      
121 See id. at 1587–88; Woodhouse, supra note 28, at 37. 
122 See infra at Part I.C; cf. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 377–78 (Freeman, J., dissenting); Tus-
kowski, supra note 99, at 180. 
123 See In re Christian G., No. J05–02142, 2007 WL 1302433, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May, 4, 
2007). 
124 See Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 373 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
125 Id.; see Benjamin, supra note 112, at 211. 
126 See Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 374 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
127 See id. 
128 See Laurie L. Levenson, Courtroom Demeanor: The Theater of the Courtroom, 92 Minn. L. 
Rev. 573, 575–76 (2008). 
129 See id. at 600. 
130 See Christian G., 2007 WL 1302433, at *2. 
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discretion.131 Appellant-juveniles are not granted relief unless there was 
an abuse of discretion by the trial judge.132 Moreover, a juvenile who 
meets the high abuse of discretion standard is not automatically victo-
rious.133 Upon finding an abuse of discretion, an appellate court will 
then inquire into whether the abuse constituted harmful, as opposed to 
harmless, error.134 Yet when the harms alleged are not reflected in the 
record, an appellate court cannot conduct a full analysis.135 In many 
cases, therefore, appellate courts reach the paradoxical conclusion that 
a trial judge’s decision about shackling was in error but resulted in no 
harm.136
C. Limited Factors in the Court’s Analysis 
 Courts’ failures to perceive real harm in what they admit to be 
cases of wrongful and unnecessary shackling are indicative of a failure 
to fully appreciate the high stakes of shackling decisions.137 In defining 
the question as one of a technical legal error, courts gloss over the fun-
damental right- and dignity-based errors at the heart of the matter.138 
In addition to the due process protections lost when juveniles do not 
get a formal hearing or strident appellate review, shackled juveniles lose 
protections through courts’ overly narrow analyses, which do not in-
clude any consideration of juveniles’ dignity.139
                                                                                                                      
131 See Commonwealth v. Chase, 217 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Mass. 1966) (“[A] judge’s refusal 
to order the removal of the shackles, where there exists any reasonable basis for anticipat-
ing that a prisoner may attempt to escape, will not be overruled.”) (emphasis added); Jona 
Goldschmidt, “Order in the Court!”: Constitutional Issues in the Law of Courtroom Decorum, 31 
Hamline L. Rev. 1, 51–52 (2008) (discussing the possibility of trial judges shackling a ju-
venile because the judge was “personally slighted or annoyed” at the accused); David R. 
Wallis, Note, Visibly Shackled: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Distinguish Between Convicted and 
Accused at Sentencing for Capital Crimes, 71 Mo. L. Rev. 447, 447 (2006). 
132 See Christian G., 2007 WL 1302433, at *2; cf. Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 
415, 445 (Va. 2008). 
133 See Christian G., 2007 WL 1302433, at *2. 
134 See In re Kenneth T., No. J05–01577, 2008 WL 3856658, at *9–10 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 
20, 2008); In re Deshaun M., 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 627, 629 (Ct. App. 2007); In re R.W.S., 728 
N.W.2d 326, 331 (N.D. 2007). 
135 See Kenneth T., 2008 WL 3856658, at *10; Tuskowski, supra note 99, at 198. 
136 See Kenneth T., 2008 WL3856658, at *10; Christian G., 2007 WL 1302433, at *2; R.W.S., 
728 N.W.2d at 331. 
137 See Deshaun, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 630–31; In re Staley, 364 N.E.2d 72, 75–76 (Ill. 1977) 
(“[I]n my opinion it is better to offend the dignity of the defendant than to suffer violence 
to erupt in the courtroom.”). 
138 See R.W.S., 728 N.W.2d at 331 (holding that shackling the juvenile was harmless er-
ror even though the court below “made no findings that [the juvenile] posed an immedi-
ate and serious risk of dangerous or disruptive behavior or of escape or flight”). 
139 See People v. Wallace, 189 P.3d 911, 927 (Cal. 2008); Millican, 906 P.2d at 860–61. 
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 Discriminate shackling only exacerbates the physical and psycho-
logical harms that indiscriminate shackling induces.140 The discrimi-
nate approach does not necessarily exclude the most vulnerable juve-
niles, for whom the effects of shackling are heightened.141 Juveniles in 
this class might include the exceptionally young, the physically abused, 
and the sexually abused.142 Not only does the approach fail to consider 
factors like abuse history, but were such histories to be taken into ac-
count, there would be no way to know how much weight they would be 
given.143
 It is at best uncertain that invoking a juvenile’s dignity principle 
would be sufficient to overcome even the most scant indicia of that ju-
venile’s dangerousness.144 For instance, assume someone physically 
abused the juvenile during early childhood, but (or perhaps as a result) 
the juvenile also has a history of unpredictable violent outbursts.145 
While violent tendencies would almost certainly appear in the court’s 
shackling analysis, there is nothing to ensure that even the most insidi-
ous abuse history would likewise appear.146 And even if factors like 
abuse history were part of the analysis, there is also no measure of how 
much the shackles would have to impact the juvenile—how much anxi-
ety he or she would have to display—before the line between accept-
able and unacceptable discomfort would be crossed.147 In this way, even 
                                                                                                                      
140 See; Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 19–20; supra Part I.C. 
141 Cf. Tuskowski, supra note 99, at 180 (noting that the defendant’s shackling aggra-
vated his preexisting physical and psychological conditions). 
142 See Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 19–20. 
143 See Wallace, 189 P.3d at 927 (refusing to “depart from the prejudice analysis we have 
applied for over [thirty] years” and thereby declining to consider “the psychological effects 
on a defendant—specifically, mental impairment, physical pain, and obstruction of com-
munication with defense counsel—that result from the imposition of restraints”) 
144 See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351–52 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (express-
ing uncertainty as to the balancing between a mentally ill defendant who creates a distur-
bance in the courtroom); see also Millican, 906 P.2d at 860–61 (declining to embrace the 
juvenile’s argument that “his demeanor itself—that is, the manner in which he presented 
himself to the court through posture, facial expressions, and the like—was affected by his 
shackling”). 
145 See Perlmutter, supra note 51, at 19–20. 
146 See Press Release, Legal Aid of N.C., supra note 50. In North Carolina, a fourteen-
year old girl was shackled in court despite having a history of sexual abuse in which she 
was handcuffed by her abuser. Id. The girl was reminded of her past abuse by being shack-
led in court, where she cried and became very emotional. Id. The trial judge did not con-
sider the girl’s abuse history as a mitigating factor warranting unshackling the girl. See id. 
However, based upon this case, the North Carolina legislature passed a bill in 2007 shifting 
state policy from indiscriminate to discriminate shackling. See Banks et al., supra note 51, 
at 10. 
147 See Benjamin, supra note 112, at 214–15. 
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if a hearing on shackling were to occur, the hearing would be unfairly 
skewed against the juvenile.148 While it is possible that courtroom secu-
rity may well outweigh any particular juvenile’s case for freedom from 
restraint, this determination cannot be made under the current ana-
lytical framework.149
IV. Improving the Discriminate Approach to Shackling 
A. Require a Hearing upon the Juvenile’s Request 
 In order to protect the fundamental rights of juveniles in delin-
quency proceedings, juvenile court judges should adopt and expand 
the discriminate approach by holding a formal hearing on the issue of 
shackling, at a juvenile’s request.150 Hearings will ensure that judges 
have a full understanding of the implications of shackling on any given 
juvenile, and will further enhance the process of assessing the individ-
ual juvenile’s risk level.151 Additionally, hearings will allow the most vul-
nerable juveniles to present mitigating factors to the court, thereby in-
creasing the probability that they will be shackled only when absolutely 
necessary.152 This result is precisely what the discriminate approach 
seeks to achieve, and is consistent with what Woodhouse encourages 
under the agency principle of her child-centric perspective.153
 The desired result is possible to achieve if we build upon the foun-
dations already in place.154 In Illinois, for instance, a trial judge must 
“give defense counsel an opportunity to present reasons why the de-
fendant should not be shackled.”155 This practice at least allows the ju-
venile to place mitigating circumstances like abuse history before the 
                                                                                                                      
148 See Wallace, 189 P.3d at 927; Millican, 906 P.2d at 860–61. 
149 See Wallace, 189 P.3d at 927; Millican, 906 P.2d at 860–61. 
150 See State v. Kunze, 738 N.W.2d 472, 478 (N.D. 2007) (“[T]he physical indicia of in-
nocence are so essential to a fair trial that the better practice is to hold a hearing so that 
factual disputes may be resolved and evidence of the facts surrounding the decision are 
made a part of the record.”) (quoting Kennedy v. Cardwell, 487 F.2d 101, 107 (6th Cir. 
1973)); see also Brian D. Gallagher & John C. Lore III, Shackling Children in Juvenile Court: 
The Growing Debate, Recent Trends and the Way to Protect Everyone’s Interest, 12 U.C. Davis J. 
Juv. L. & Pol’y 453, 478–79 (2008) (proposing a statute that would require a brief on the 
record hearing on the propriety of shackling a juvenile and suggesting a ten-point check-
list of factors for the court to consider). 
151 See Tiffany A. v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 3d 363, 370–71 (Ct. App. 2007). 
152 See id. 
153 See Woodhouse, supra note 28, at 37–38. 
154 See People v. Millsap, 873 N.E.2d 396, 404 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). 
155 Id. 
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court, which can then be fleshed out at a hearing with the examination 
of witnesses.156
 Another source of options for reform comes from the adult crimi-
nal justice system in Massachusetts, in which a defendant must receive a 
hearing before it is permissible to shackle the defendant in the court-
room.157 The required hearing is by nature flexible, without a “rigid 
legislative formulation.”158 At the hearing, facts on both sides are able 
to be “thrashed out.”159 Given the extent to which due process in Mas-
sachusetts’ juvenile system echoes its adult system, this would not be a 
difficult procedure to implement in juvenile court.160
B. Re-evaluate Notions of Harmless Error 
 In addition to reforms at trial, changes are needed on appeal.161 
Appellate courts must serve as more of a check on trial judges, and 
should adopt a broader interpretation of the harmless error stan-
dard.162 Rather than focus on whether a trial judge made a technical 
error of law, an appellate court should center its analysis on whether a 
juvenile’s fundamental rights were fairly weighed at trial.163 This shift in 
focus would allow juveniles an additional opportunity to present evi-
dence of mitigating factors where the juvenile court denies or disre-
gards that opportunity.164 Defense counsel and juvenile court judges 
should be encouraged to place their observations of the juvenile on the 
record so that the non-verbal harms of shackling will be more readily 
                                                                                                                      
156 See id. 
157 See Commonwealth v. Martin, 676 N.E.2d 451, 456 (Mass. 1997); Benjamin, supra 
note 112, at 206. 
158 See Martin, 676 N.E.2d at 456; Benjamin, supra note 112, at 206. 
159 See Martin, 676 N.E.2d at 456 (citing Commonwealth v. Brown, 305 N.E.2d 830, 836 
(Mass. 1973)). 
160 See Barbara Kaban, Rethinking a “Knowing, Intelligent, and Voluntary Waiver” in Massa-
chusetts’ Juvenile Courts, 5 J. Ctr. for Fams., Child. & Cts. 35, 37 (2004) (“In Massachu-
setts, children are afforded the full panoply of due process rights and protections enjoyed 
by adults.”). 
161 See People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d 349, 373–74 (Ill. 2006) (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
162 See State v. Anderson, 192 P.3d 673, 678 (Kan. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that shack-
ling the defendant was error but that that error was not harmless). Contra In re Christian 
G., No. J05–02142, 2007 WL 1302433, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. May, 4, 2007). 
163 See Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 373–74 (Freeman, J., dissenting); People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 
920, 940–41 (Ill. 2000) (“We ask whether a substantial right has been affected to such a 
degree that we cannot confidently state that defendant’s trial was fundamentally fair. . . . 
[W]hen an error arises at trial that is of such gravity that it threatens the very integrity of 
the judicial process, the court must act to correct the error, so that the fairness and the 
reputation of the process may be preserved and protected.”). 
164 See Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 373–74 (Freeman, J., dissenting). 
2009] Shackling of Defendants in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings 421 
apparent to appellate courts.165 Defense counsel, of course, should be 
especially careful to object to shackling when, in his or her experience, 
the shackling appears unjustified or excessive.166 Further, defense coun-
sel should encourage their clients to speak up and tell sitting judges 
about their discomforts, assuring the youths that they will not be pun-
ished for doing so.167 This would encourage the juvenile to become a 
more active and engaged participant in the court proceeding and 
would provide him or her with an enhanced sense of agency, regardless 
of how the court ultimately rules.168
C. Institute a More Expansive Analysis 
 In addition to these changes, juvenile court judges should also 
consider a wider array of factors than they do at present, including ju-
veniles’ dignity.169 This would make the discriminate approach more 
fair, humane, and rehabilitative.170 Moreover, by taking a more child-
centric perspective, the court would better satisfy Woodhouse’s dignity 
principle.171
 One promising option is to look to the international stage.172 One 
scholar has critiqued shackling juveniles in light of the United Nations 
Declaration of Human Rights, which bans “cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment.”173 The scholar further cites to the United Nations Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).174 The CRC requires that 
children’s dignity receive respect.175
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 Some U.S. jurisdictions are already off to a good start.176 In Cali-
fornia, for instance, one of the justifications for the requirement of ne-
cessity is “the affront to human dignity” that accompanies indiscrimi-
nate shackling.177 In Texas, Chief Justice Hedges of the Texas Court of 
Appeals issued a recent dissent in which he considered the accused’s 
dignity by accounting for potential embarrassment to the accused as 
well as “physical burden and pain of restraints.”178 Finally, Illinois prac-
tice, once again, offers a good model for reform.179 The factors in an 
Illinois court’s shackling analysis include: 
(1) the seriousness of the present charge against the defen-
dant; (2) the defendant’s temperament and character; (3) the 
defendant’s age and physical characteristics; (4) the defen-
dant’s past record; (5) any past escapes or attempted escapes 
by the defendant; (6) evidence of a present plan of escape by 
the defendant; (7) any threats by the defendant to harm oth-
ers or create a disturbance; (8) evidence of self-destructive 
tendencies on the part of the defendant; (9) the risk of mob 
violence or of attempted revenge by others; (10) the possibil-
ity of rescue attempts by other offenders still at large; (11) the 
size and mood of the audience; (12) the nature and physical 
security of the courtroom; and (13) the adequacy and avail-
ability of alternative remedies.180
It is noteworthy that Illinois courts consider such factors as the juve-
nile’s age, character, and temperament, and that they make room for 
alternatives.181
 The expansive list in the Illinois analysis gives juvenile court judges 
the ability to balance both child-centric and security concerns.182 The 
addition of factors such as a juvenile’s abuse history would further bol-
ster the courts’ attention to the particular child at issue.183 Of course, 
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the weight given to a juvenile’s dignity would vary with the severity of 
the risk posed, as balanced by other mitigating factors.184 The key task 
for courts in the future will be to build off of this foundation, more 
fully weighing the child-centric concerns as outlined in this Com-
ment.185
Conclusion 
 While the discriminate approach to shackling is certainly prefer-
able to the indiscriminate approach, it nevertheless fails to provide ju-
veniles with the due process they dearly need.186 By requiring a hear-
ing, encouraging more active appellate review, and adopting a more 
expansive totality test that includes a juvenile’s dignity, juveniles’ fun-
damental rights will be much better protected.187 Moreover, Wood-
house’s agency and dignity principles will be more fully observed.188
 With a child-centric framework in hand, substantive reforms may 
be just off the horizon.189 On the national scale, current efforts in Flor-
ida and North Carolina will provide a good barometer for just how far 
we have come and just how far we have yet to go.190 Yet we must remain 
confident that the courts will soon come to realize the fact that, even in 
states that have progressed beyond the indiscriminate approach to the 
discriminate approach, the fundamental rights of juveniles are under 
restraint.191
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